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Why is trade in some industries freer than in others? The great postwar 
liberalization of  trade chiefly benefited trade in manufactured  goods 
between  developed  countries, leaving trade in primary products and 
North-South trade in  manufactures  still highly restricted. Within the 
manufacturing sector some industries seem to view trade as a zero-sum 
game, while in others producers seem to believe that reciprocal tariff cuts 
will benefit firms in both countries. In a period of  rising protectionist 
pressures, it might be very useful to have a theory which explains these 
differences in the treatment of  different kinds of  trade. 
This paper is an attempt to take a step in the direction of such a theory, 
I develop a multi-industry model of trade in which each industry consists 
of  a number of  differentiated  products.  The pattern of  interindustrial 
specialization is determined by  factor proportions, so that there is an 
element of comparative advantage to the model. But scale economies in 
production ensure that each country produces only a limited number of 
the products within each industry, so there is also intraindustry specializa- 
tion and trade which does not depend on comparative advantage. The 
model thus draws on recent work on the theory of intraindustry trade by 
Dixit and Norman (1980), Lancaster (1980), and the author. 
In the model, liberalizing trade within an industry leads each country to 
expand both its imports and its exports in that industry. A country which 
is a net exporter in an industry will still have some demand for the 
products produced abroad, so net exporters will still be gross importers 
and vice versa. This creates the possibility that reciprocal removal of 
trade barriers can lead to increased sales by producers in both countries. 
Paul Krugman is the Ford International Associate Professor of  Management at  Mas- 
sachusetts Institute of  Technology. He has published several articles establishing him as a 
leading trade theorist. 
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If  this is the case, presumably trade liberalization will be relatively easy to 
achieve. 
The paper shows that whether this happens depends in economically 
sensible ways on industry characteristics. Specifically, producers in both 
countries will  gain from mutual trade liberalization in  an industry if 
neither country has too great a comparative advantage and the products 
within the industry are strongly differentiated. This fits in well with casual 
observation: trade is more liberal in differentiated manufactures than in 
homogeneous primary products, more restricted between countries with 
very  unequal wage-rental ratios  than between  countries with similar 
factor prices. Thus, although the model is admittedly dependent on a 
number of very special assumptions, it does produce results which seem 
to shed light on the variation in protection across industries. 
The paper is organized in four sections. Section 7.1 sets out the basic 
model for a single economy. In section 7.2, the pattern of specialization 
and trade between two such economies is considered. Section 7.3 consid- 
ers the effects of mutual trade liberalization on a single industry. Finally, 
section 7.4 suggests some conclusions. 
7.1  Structure of the Model 
The model developed in this paper is based on the recently developed 
theory of intraindustry trade. In this theory, an “industry” is a group of 
products  which  are all  produced  with  the  same  factor proportions. 
Whether a country is a net importer or exporter in  an industry thus 
depends on the conventional forces of  comparative advantage. Because 
of scale economies in production, however, each country specializes in a 
limited subset of the products within each industry. The result is “intrain- 
dustry” trade4ountries which are net exporters in a particular industry 
will still be gross importers, because foreigners will be producing dif- 
ferentiated products. 
This theory of trade helps explain why there is so much trade between 
similar countries and why  the trade between these countries consists 
largely of two-way trade in similar products. The price one pays for these 
insights is that one must deal with illuminating special cases rather than 
general models. Economies of scale mean that markets cannot be per- 
fectly competitive, and we are only able to model monopolistic competi- 
tion by making special assumptions about utility and production func- 
tions.  In  dealing with models of  intraindustry trade, then, one must 
always be satisfied with illustrating propositions  rather than proving 
them. 
As  one might expect from these remarks, the model  about to be 
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These assumptions may at first seem too special; but I believe that their 
simplicity and the intuitive appeal of  the results they yield justify them. 
Let us consider, then, an economy consisting of  a number of  “indus- 
tries,” each of which consists of many products. The appropriate defini- 
tion of an industry has been a major problem in discussions of intraindus- 
try trade: should a “supply-side” or a “demand-side’’  concept be used? In 
the particular model  considered here, there is a natural grouping of 
products which meets both concepts; we have “industries” whose prod- 
ucts are relatively close substitutes on both the supply and demand sides. 
One  might justify this as an empirically  reasonable assumption by arguing 
that products with  similar characteristics are likely to have relatively 
similar inputs.  In the theoretical model presented here, however, the 
characteristics which differentiate products  are not explicitly set out. 
Thus the convenient existence of a natural definition of industries should 
be regarded as one of  the model’s special assumptions. 
On  the demand side, then, everyone in the economy will be assumed to 
have the same tastes, which can be represented by a two-level CES utility 
function: 
where we define 
Here cij  is an individual’s consumption of thejth  product of  industry i, 
and Ni  is the (large) number of  potential products in the ith  industry. We 
note that the interindustry elasticity of  substitution is 1/1 -  y, while the 
intruindustry elasticity of  substitution (which varies across industries) is 
1/1 -  Oi for the ith  industry. 
On the supply side, I will assume that the products of each industry are 
produced by  a single factor, “labor,” which is wholly specific to that 
industry.  That  is, we  have  a labor supply Li  corresponding to each 
industry i.  This is a relatively crude way of introducing a supply side into 
the model; it has the virtue, as we will see, of allowing an easy parameteri- 
zation of  the amount of  comparative advantage in an industry. If  we 
assume full employment of  resources, we can write the resource con- 
straint as 
(3)  Li-74,  i=l,.  . . ,  K, 
where 4,  is labor used in producing product j of  industry i. 
involve a fixed set-up cost and constant marginal costs thereafter: 
Labor used in the production of a particular product will be assumed to 200  Paul Krugman 
t-=Oifq-=O  11  11  i=l,.  . . ,  K 
(4) 
where qij  is the output of  the jth  product of  industry i and the parameters 
ai  and pi  are assumed constant across the products within an industry. 
Equilibrium in this model will take the form of monopolistic competi- 
tion. Each product will be produced by only one firm, while free entry will 
drive profits to zero. The simplified structure of the model makes it easy 
to determine pricing behavior and the size and number of  firms in each 
industry. 
First, consider pricing behavior. If the number of firms in each industry 
is large, each firm can disregard interindustry  substitution and focus 
solely on intraindustry competition. Thus each firm in the ith  industry will 
face a demand curve with an elasticity equal to the industry elasticity of 
substitution: 
(5)  E~ = 1/1 -  Bi 
Profit-maximizing pricing behavior will involve setting the price at  E~/ 
E~ -  1 times marginal cost, so that we have 
= ai  + piqij  if  qij  >  0  j = 1  ,  . . . ,  Ni, 
i = 1, . . . ,  K. 
E.  pi = ApIwj 
Ei-  1  (6) 
= 8i'piwi  i= 1, . . . ,  K, 
where pi  is the profit-maximizing  price of firms in industry i-the  same for 
all firms-and  wi  is the wage rate of  industry i's  sector-specific labor. 
Consider next the profitability of firms. Economic profits earned by a 
firm in industry i, charging price pi  and with sales qi,  are 
(7)  Ti =piqi -  (OLi + piqj)wi  i = 1, . . . ,  K. 
Using the pricing rule (6), we can rewrite this as 
(8) 
If  there is free entry and exit, the number of firms in an industry will fall 
if profits are negative and rise if they are positive, so that in equilibrium 
ni  = 0. But this lets us determine the equilibrium level of  output: 
T.=  [  0-1  piqi- ai- piqi]wi  i= 1, . . . ,  K. 
(9)  qi  = aiei/pi(i  -  ei)  i = I, . . . ,  K. 
Given the size of firms, the number of firms and thus of products actually 
produced within an industry can be determined from the full employment 
condition: 
nj = L,/(a,  + pic&) 
= ~~(1-  eiyai  (10)  i = 1,  . . . ,  K. 201  Trade in Differentiated Products 
Finally, we need to determine relative wages w,.  We need not go into 
detail here; it is enough to note that relative demands for industry outputs 
are determined by the utility function (1) and that relative supplies are 
determined by the sector-specific labor forces 15,.  We will return to this 
question in section 7.4. 
This model, then, gives rise to an equilibrium in which all industries are 
monopolistically competitive, containing a number of  firms producing 
differentiated products and charging prices above marginal cost. In the 
next section we will consider what happens when two such economies are 
allowed to trade. First, however, we should note that, while all industries 
are monopolistic, the degree of monopoly varies. This variation will turn 
out to be crucially important in determining the consequences of  trade 
liberalization. 
Consider the pricing equation (6).  Price exceeds marginal cost by the 
ratio 8;'.  We can view 8, which is inversely related to the intraindustry 
elasticity of substitution, as an inverse index of product differentiation; if 
8, is low, products are highly differentiated and firms have considerable 
monopoly power. Further, since price equals average cost in equilibrium, 
8 is the ratio of  marginal to average cost, and is thus an inverse index of 
unexploited economies of  scale. 
7.2  Comparative Advantage and the Trade Pattern 
Suppose that there exists another economy very similar to the one 
described in section 7.1. It shares the same technology, and its consumers 
have the same utility function. The only difference is that the second 
economy has a different endowment of  industry-specific  labor supplies, 
which we will represent as LT, i = 1, . . . ,  K. 
Suppose that these economies are able to trade at zero transportation 
cost. What can we say about the resulting pattern of  trade? 
Determining pricing and production in the second country is somewhat 
simpler than might appear. First, given the identity of  utility and cost 
functions in the two countries, pricing behavior and the equilibrium size 
of firm in each industry are the same in our second country as in our first. 
Price is a markup on marginal cost: 
(11) 
Output is determined by the condition of  zero profits: 
pT  = 8;'piwT  i = 1, . . . ,  K. 
(12)  =  Cq3,/pi(l -  8,)  i = 1, . . . ,  K. 
The number of products produced in the second country in each industry 
is proportional to its labor force in that industry: 
(13)  nT=LT(1-8,)/ai  i=l,.  . . ,  K. 2002  PaulKrugman 
Notice that we cannot determine which products in the industry will be 
produced in which country. What we can be sure of is that there will be no 
overlap. Since firms can costlessly differentiate their products, no two 
firms will ever produce the same product; and thus firms in different 
countries will specialize in different products. 
Finally, given the symmetry of the problem, wages in each industry will 
be equalized across countries: 
(14)  wi=wl  i=l,  . . . ,  K. 
Before proceeding to the pattern  of  trade, it  is useful to begin by 
regarding the two countries together as a single economy. The industries 
in the world economy have labor forces L1 + L:, . . . ,  LK  + Lg; and 
these labor forces receive equilibrium wages w1 = wr ,  . . . ,  wK = gk.  If 




Y=  z  WiLi, 
The wage rates wi are determined by demand. Since the countries have 
identical, homothetic tastes, they will spend the same share of income on 
each industry’s products: 
(17)  nipiqi + ni*pi*qi*  = Ti(Y + Y*), 
where ri,  the share of  expenditure falling on industry i’s products, is of 
course dependent on relative prices. Since profits are zero, sales of  an 
industry equal its factor payments: 
(18)  WiLi + wi*LF = Ti(Y  + Y*). 
We are now prepared to examine the pattern of  trade. Let Xi  be the 
value of the first country’s exports in industry i.  We know that the second 
country will spend a share ni  of its income on industry i’s products. At the 
same time, it will spend an equal share of this expenditure on each of the 
products within the industry. So the share of  i expenditure falling on the 
first country’s products is ni/(ni  + n;). Thus the value of  i exports is 
TiLi 
Li+ LT 
-  --  Y*  i=l,.  . . ,  K. 
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TiLf 
Lit- L.? 
Mi = -  Y  i=l,  ...,  K. 
We can use  (19) and (20) to establish two interesting propositions 
about trade.  First, notice that  a country’s net  export position in an 
industry depends on its relative endowment of  the industry-specific  fac- 
tor. Consider, for example, a widely used measure of “revealed compara- 
tive advantage”: 
(21)  Ri = In (&/Mi). 
From (19) and (20), we have 
Ri = ln(L,/L;)  -  ln(Y/Y*).  (22) 
Since Y/Y* is a term common to all industries, the ranking of industries 
by revealed comparative advantage is determined by relative factor en- 
dowments. 
The second proposition concerns the importance of  “intraindustry” 
trade. Obviously, (19) and (20) imply that a country will import even 
where it has a comparative advantage, export where it has a comparative 
disadvantage. A widely used measure of  this intraindustry trade is the 
index of  trade overlap, 
Algebraic manipulation allows us to rewrite this as 
Thus intraindustry trade will predominate in those industries in which 
the absolute value  of  R  is close to zero, i.e.,  in which  comparative 
advantage is weak. 
We have shown in the last two sections that it is possible to develop a 
relatively simple trade model in which there are many industries, and in 
which the degree of monopoly and the extent of comparative advantage 
vary in economically meaningful ways across industries. It remains to 
show why these industry characteristics matter. The next section consid- 
ers how  the parameters  which describe an industry can make  trade 
liberalization easy or difficult. 
7.3  Effects of Trade Liberalization 
Suppose that some particular industry, say industry  i, is subject to trade 
restrictions. Ordinarily, producers in each country will oppose any uni- 204  PaulKrugman 
lateral elimination of  their country’s restrictions; by  exposing them to 
foreign competition this will  lower the wages of  industry-specific  labor 
and  will  not  usually  offer  a  compensating consumption gain.  But  a 
simultaneous removal of  restrictions by  both countries may be another 
matter. Not only will it increase the welfare of  producers in the country 
with a comparative advantage; it may benefit producers in the country 
with a comparative disadvantage as well! 
How is this possible? The products of different countries are imperfect 
substitutes for one another; removing trade restrictions offers consumers 
a wider range of choice and may lead them to spend a larger share of their 
income on industry i’s products. If  the products are sufficiently differenti- 
ated and comparative advantage is weak, this effect may be enough to 
raise the industry-specific wage rate in the country with a comparative 
disadvantage. 
To establish this point, it is helpful to make several simplifying assump- 
tions: 
i) Industry i is taken to be “small,” so that we disregard the effect of 
trade liberalization on national income and on other industries’ prices. 
ii) Trade liberalization is assumed to take an extreme form. Before 
liberalization, trade in industry i (though not in other industries) is wholly 
prohibited. After liberalization, trade is completely free. Thus we ex- 
clude limited or differential liberalization. 
iii) To exclude effects which  arise from  differences in  the size of 
countries, as opposed to specific industry characteristics, the countries 
are assumed to have equal national incomes: Y = Y*. 
We can now begin the formal analysis. The crucial aspect of the model 
is the existence of  many products within each industry and the value 
consumers place on this diversity. This aspect can be viewed as creating a 
divergence between physical output in an industry and “true” output 
taking into account the value of  diversity. Consider the utility formula- 
tion (1)  and (2). One way of reading this (a way suggested by Ethier 1980) 
is to think of  consumers assembling final consumption goods Ci from 
components Cip It is then apparent that the output of  these final con- 
sumption goods depends on the diversity of products available as well as 
on physical output. Specifically, an index of  “true” output for industry i 
can be written 
where Ei is the number of  products available and qi  is the output of  a 
representative product. 
Similarly, there is a divergence between the actual prices of products 
and the “true” price index reflecting the value of  diversity. For a given 
price of  representative products in  an industry, the price of  the final 
consumption  good  “assembled”  from  these  products  will  fall as  the 205  Trade in Differentiated Products 
diversity of products increases. Again, by inspecting (l),  we can see that a 
“true” price index will have the form 
t -  -(ei-  1yei 
where pi is the price of  a representative product. 
What is the definition of iii? Since we are deriving our indices from the 
utility function, the relevant number of  products is the number available 
to the  consumer.  Before trade liberalization,  iii = ni, the number  of 
domestic products; after trade, iii = ni + nr, the number of  products 
produced worldwide. As Ethier (1979) has pointed out, in this kind of 
situation increasing returns apply on a world scale. 
Now consider the situation of the industry before trade liberalization. 
We already know how ni,  qi,  and pi  are determined; using (6), (9), and 
(10) and writing the results in logarithmic form, we have 
(27) 
for the true index of  output, and 
(26)  Pi -  ni  Pi 7 
In  Qf = lnaiei/pi(l -  0,) + 8C’ln Li(l -  ei)/ai 
1 -  oi 
ei 
lnPi = lne;lpiwi  - -  In Li  (1 -  0,) /ai. 
The demand for true output will  depend on income and prices. The 
form of the utility function ensures that all industries will face an income 
elasticity of demand of  one and a price elasticity of 1/1 -  y. Thus we can 
write a demand function in terms of  true output and prices: 
1  In Qf =  Ai + In Y -  -lnPi, 
1-Y 
(29) 
where Ai is a constant term. 
Note that we have not specified the units in which income and prices 
are measured, Since the industry is assumed small, however, and we are 
considering a liberalization of  trade in one industry at a time, the relative 
prices of all other industries’ products can be taken as fixed, and thus all 
other output  (and all other factors) can be regarded  as a composite 
commodity. We can then use this composite commodity as numeraire. 
We can solve (29) for the wage rate of industry i labor. Using (27) and 
(28), we can derive the expression 
(30)  lnw, = Ki + (1 -  lnL,,  y)lnY - - 
ei -  Y 
ei 
where Ki includes all of  the terms which will not change when trade is 
liberalized. 
Trade liberalization amounts to moving to a larger economy, with an 
income of  Y + Y*  = 2Y and with an industry i labor force of  Li + Lr. 206  PaulKrugman 
Let us define uj  as the share of the first country in the ith  industry’s  labor 
force: 
(31)  ui  = L,/(L,  + LT). 
Since Y and Y* are assumed equal, ui  can be regarded as an index of 
comparative advantage. We will be concerned with the case ui%  Y2; i.e., 
what happens to wages in the industry at a comparative disadvantage? 
Using the definition of ui,  the change in the wage rate in industry i can 
be written 
Alnwi = (1  -y)ln2 + k-2  lnui. 
ei 
The first term is positive, the second of ambiguous sign. There are three 
relevant parameters: y, which is common to all industries, and ei and ui, 
which are specific to industry i. 
Both of  the industry-specific parameters have economic interpreta- 
tions. As just noted, ui  is an index of comparative advantage; the lower is 
ui, the greater the disadvantage of  domestic producers. And we have 
already noted that Bi is an index of product differentiation: the lower is Hi, 
the more value consumers place on diversity and the greater the monop- 
oly power of  firms. 
The effect of these factors can be determined by noticing the following: 
i) For Bi 5  y, i.e., a situation of highly differentiated products, A In  wi is 
ii) For Bi > y, A In  wi is increasing in ui and decreasing in  Oi. 
iii) A In  wi  = 0 when Bi  = 1, ui  = %. 
The implications of these points are shown in figure 7.1. On the axes 
are shown the industry characteristics of  product  differentiation  and 
comparative advantage. In the relevant region, what we have shown is 
that we can draw a line dividing industries into two groups. In the lower 
right are industries with strong comparative advantage and weak product 
differentiation. In these industries the producers in the comparatively 
disadvantaged country stand to lose from liberalization. In the other 
group of industries-those  with weak comparative advantage and strong 
product differentiation-producers  in  both countries gain from liber- 
alization. 
always positive. 
7.4  Conclusions 
This paper has developed a simple multi-industry model of trade which 
is designed to give some insight into the reasons why trade is freer in some 
goods  than  others. While the model  is  dependent  on  many  special 
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analysis suggests that bilateral trade liberalization will  be favored by 
producers in both countries if  (i) neither country has a strong compara- 
tive advantage in the industry and (ii) the products of  different firms 
within the industry are highly differentiated. 
This analysis is very suggestive. In actual experience trade liberali- 
zation has typically taken place between countries with fairly similar 
economic structure; it has been biased toward industries in which com- 
parative advantage has been weak, so that growth in trade is largely 
intraindustry in character; and it has been easier to liberalize trade in 
industries producing differentiated products than where firms’ output is 
more homogeneous.  This is casual, impressionistic evidence; but  the 
theory does seem to accord in at least a rough way with experience. 
The analysis has mixed implications for the political economy of trade, 
in that it  suggests more  optimism on the “economy”  side than  the 
“political” side. In the traditional view of trade, moves toward freer trade 
always involve a struggle between special interests which favor protection 
and the general interest, which is served by liberalization. According to 
this view , actual  experiences of  liberalization show that the general 208  Paul Krugman 
interest does sometimes prevail. But we have seen that the special in- 
terests will not always oppose liberalization. This is good news: but it 
casts some doubt on the favorable evaluation of past liberalization. Is it 
possible that the general interest, in fact, never does prevail? 
References 
Dixit, A.,  and V. Norman. 1980. The theory of international  trade: A text. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dixit, A.,  and J. Stiglitz. 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum 
product diversity. American Economic Review 67 (June): 297-308. 
Ethier, W. 1979. Internationally decreasing costs and world trade Journal 
of  International Economics 9 (February): 1-24. 
. 1980. National and international returns to scale in the modern 
theory of  international trade.  University of  Pennsylvania, mimeo- 
graphed. 
Krugman, P. 1979. Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and 
international trade. Journal of  International Economics 9 (November): 
.  1980. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern 
Lancaster, K. 1980. Intraindustry trade under perfect monopolistic com- 
469-79. 
of  trade. American Economic Review 70 (December): 950-59. 
petition. Journal of  International Economics 10 (May): 151-76. 
Comment  Kelvin Lancaster 
The model of product-differentiated trade presented by Paul Krugman, 
which is based on the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition,' 
represents a different approach from that developed in my  own work,2 
and masks, I believe, the real problems associated with import competi- 
tion when products are differentiated. 
Differentiated models, like differentiated products, have characteris- 
tics in different proportions, and so do the Dixit-Stiglitz and Lancaster 
models. The important differences for the present purposes have been 
listed in table 7.1, and I believe the table saves a great deal of  verbal 
explanation. Some of  my  criticisms of  the Dixit-Stiglitz model are on 
Kelvin Lancaster is the John Bates Clark Professor of Economics at Columbia University. 
He has made seminal contributions to  economic theory,  especially in second-best  and 
product differentiation. His writings on international trade theory have also had a substan- 
tial impact. 209  Trade in Differentiated Products 
record el~ewhere,~  and I am concerned here only with those features of 
the original model or with Krugman’s extension which give what I con- 
sider to be an erroneous picture of  import competition under product 
differentiation. 
The feature of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman  model which differentiates it 
most from my own is the absence of any reference to the properties or 
characteristics (specification) of  the products.  All products,  however 
similar to or different from other products of the same industry, are equal 
substitutes for all industry products. A consumer does not benefit be- 
cause a new product is closer to what he or she would order on a custom 
basis (his preferred specification), but simply because there is a greater 
number of goods, all of which are purchased by every consumer. Firms do 
not need to agonize over the design of a new product: whatever the 
design, it is guaranteed a market with properties identical to those of  the 
markets for all other goods in the industry. The simplicity of the Krugman 
model, which  can derive some results much more expeditiously than 
mine, must be weighed against special predictions that do not generalize 
and some notable eccentricities. 
Import Competition with Identical Countries 
In both the Krugman and Lancaster models, identical countries can 
gain from trade of  an intraindustry kind even though there are no com- 
parative advantage or factor endowment differences between them, and 
the special features of trade in differentiated products can be seen most 
clearly in this case. Since the countries are identical, their economies will 
have the same structure in  a no-trade situation, and, in particular, the 
number of goods in each product-differentiated industry will be the same 
in the two countries. In the Lancaster model, the same goods will  be 
produced in both countries since the decisions as to specification will be 
made under identical circumstances. In the Krugman model, the goods 
need not be the same since there is no decision mechanism for determin- 
ing specification, and the choice of  goods to be produced can be con- 
sidered as a random draw from a very large, even infinite, number of 
possibilities, except that no two firms in the same country will produce the 
same good. 
If  costless trade is now opened up between the two countries, both 
models agree that (1) there will be intraindustry trade in each product- 
differentiated industry, and (2) each good will be produced in one coun- 
try only, half for domestic use and half for export. 
The models differ considerably, however, in the predicted post-trade 
structure of the product-differentiated industries and in the nature of the 
gains from trade. In the Krugman model, the number of  products de- 
pends only on the amount of the industry-specific  factor so that the world 
industry will produce twice as many products as each country in isola- Table C7.1  Comparison of  Krugman and Lancaster Models of Product Differentiation 
Nature of goods 
Individual consumers 
Consumer diversity 
Welfare gain from product 
variety 
Direct objects of utility  Possess properties or characteristics in certain, 
proportions (specification). Goods desired for their 
characteristics. 
Treat all goods symmetrically (within industry); 
purchase all goods 
Each has “most preferred specification” for good in 
group, chooses single good on  basis of both price and 
specification (will pay more for good closer to most 
preferred specification) 
All consumers identical  No product variety within industry without diversity 
(e.g., automobiles). Extent of  diversity determines 
degree of  variety, given other conditions. 
Individual utility greater from l/n  units each of  n 
goods than from l/(n -  1) units of  n -  1 goods (utility 
becomes infinite as n+m) 
Greater variety enables more consumers to have a 
good closer to most preferred specification. Variety 
raises average welfare level, but not necessarily that 
of  every individual. Elasticity of  demand for single 
good 
Production and cost properties 
Decisions faced by firms 




Fixed parameter of  utility function. Independent of 
number of  goods. Does not depend on events outside 
industry. 
Fixed plus variable cost. System explodes (infinite 
utility) without fixed cost. Factors immobile between 
industries.* 
Pricelquantity and entry only 
Given system parameters, determined solely by 
supply of  industry-specific factor. Independent of 
market size, output levels, or events outside industry. 
Determined by utility and cost function parameters 
only. Independent of  size of  market, number of 
products, events outside industry. 
Simplicity 
Depends on specification difference from close goods. 
(Approaches infinity as goods become more similar.) 
Increases with number of  goods. Depends on 
interindustry relationships. 
Any form permissible. Custom production (infinite 
differentiation) if  no economies of  scale. Factors 
freely mobile. 
Specification of  product as well as price/quantity and 
entry 
Determined by size of  market, diversity of 
preferences, cost structures, equilibria of other 
industries 
Determined jointly with number of  products; depends 
on same factors 
Realism and flexibility 
*This is a special feature of  the Krugman model, not part of  the Dixit-Stiglitz analysis. 212  Paul Krugman 
tion-that  is, each country will produce the same number of  products 
after trade as before. Furthermore, since equilibrium outputs are deter- 
mined entirely by system parameters, the output of every good will be the 
same after trade as before. There are no gains from economies of scale as a 
result of trade. The gains are due to the fact that consumers now purchase 
twice as many different goods as before, although each in only half the 
pre-trade quantity, which increases welfare because of  the assumed struc- 
ture of  the utility function. 
In the Lancaster  model,  the equilibrium  number  of  goods in the 
post-trade world market cannot be so easily determined, since the degree 
of product differentiation depends in a complex way on the size of  the 
market and the structure of  the cost functions. However, it can easily be 
shown that the number in this case must be less than twice the pre-trade 
number in each country, and the equilibrium output levels are always 
greater than in a single isolated country. Thus the Krugman outcome is 
impossible in the Lancaster model, in which gains from trade due to 
economies of scale will always occur. The extreme case in the Lancaster 
model occurs with production functions which are homogeneous of  de- 
gree greater than unity (conventional increasing returns to scale without 
fixed costs), when the number of  goods is independent of the size of the 
market and thus there will be the same number of  goods after trade as 
before, so the number produced in each country is halved and the output 
of  each good approximately d~ubled.~ 
The differences between the two models as to the predicted structural 
changes in the differentiated-goods industries lead to crucial differences 
concerning the assessment of the effects of  import competition and the 
associated political economy. 
The Krugman  model depicts a very smooth transition from pre- to 
post-trade conditions. The  world industry will consist of the  same number 
of firms, each producing the same level of output, as in the two countries 
together before trade. The worst that can happen to a firm as a result of 
trade is that, by chance, the independent random choice of  products in 
the two countries should have resulted  in a firm in the other country 
producing  the same product, in  which case either or both  firms can 
costlessly switch to a different product with no loss. The incomes of  the 
industry-specific factors are unchanged by trade in the identical country 
case, so both the entrepreneurs and the factor owners are neutral as 
between trade and no trade. The gains from trade are all consumption 
gains (variety), so the consumers’ vote in favor of  trade would be un- 
opposed. 
The Lancaster model predicts a very different situation, in which some 
firms in  each country must  leave  the industry.  In  the homogeneous 
production  function  case, the opening of  trade will  lead  to a direct 
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part in the other, since there will be only one producer of each good at the 
final equilibrium. Half the firms in each country should close down, but 
which ones? If  the economies are truly identical, there is no obvious 
mechanism (or even a convenient hidden hand) for choosing the particu- 
lar firms,S  a situation that could result in all firms in both countries feeling 
simultaneously threatened, so that there might be industry-wide  lobbying 
against imports in both countries. On the other hand, the firms that 
survive will be better off  than before (they will have greatly increased 
outputs), so if  firms differ in their perceptions of  their own powers to 
compete, there may be firms that perceive the opening of  trade as an 
export opportunity rather than as import competition, and thus favor it. 
The homogeneous production function case presents the head-on clash 
in its most extreme form. In the more general case, the world equilibrium 
will call for fewer firms than in the two countries before trade so that firms 
must close down in both countries, but not as many as half. On the other 
hand, the new equilibrium will require a different set of products, so that 
even the firms that remain will have to change the specifications of their 
products to a greater or lesser degree. The search for the appropriate new 
products provides a potential selection mechanism for determining which 
firms survive-those  that choose the right specifications. This process 
means that all firms must adapt and none can hope to survive merely by 
continuing as before and hoping its opposite number will go under. The 
one-on-one element is removed, with less potential for universal opposi- 
tion to trade. 
Consumer gains from trade in the Lancaster model are more tangible 
than in the Krugman model, since in the former they include the effect of 
economies of scale as evidenced in lower prices for the traded goods, and 
this presumably makes the case for trade rather easier to argue. On the 
other hand, a particular individual may actually lose from trade under the 
Lancaster conditions, since the post-trade world equilibrium may not 
produce  some product very close to his preferred specification, even 
though this had been produced in the pre-trade situation. Such a loss may 
not be counterbalanced by the lowered price of whatever product is now 
closest to his personal preference. There will, however, be more consum- 
ers for whom the reverse is true, since the greater variety will enable more 
consumers to have goods very close to their preferred specification  than 
in the pre-trade situation. 
Comparative Advantage 
Comparative advantage is not required to explain the existence of  a 
large volume of trade in a world economy in which product-differentiated 
industries are of  major importance, but comparative advantage effects 
may exist along with those effects (scale economies in Lancaster, variety 
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I have discussed several aspects of  comparative advantage within the 
Lancaster framework elsewhere,6  primarily in the context of a product- 
differentiated  sector  (manufacturing)  and  a  nondifferentiated  sector 
(agriculture). The broad features are simple enough: for a sufficiently 
large comparative advantage difference, specialization will occur with 
exchange of one industry’s products for those of another, as in traditional 
trade theory. For a lesser difference in comparative advantage there will 
be  intraindustry trade, but the country with the comparative advantage in 
the industry  will  produce  a  larger  number of  the products than the 
country with the comparative disadvantage. Each good will be produced 
in only one country but sold in both, the country having the comparative 
advantage in a particular industry running a surplus on the intraindustry 
trade which is offset against industries in which it has the comparative 
disadvantage. 
Commencing  from a  no-trade situation,  the opening of  trade will 
necessarily  result in a shrinking of  the industry with the comparative 
disadvantage, a shrinking that will be more severe than in the identical 
country case. If the comparative disadvantage is great enough, the whole 
industry will close, but in general it will remain with a small number of 
firms. The output of  the firms that remain will, however, expand, and 
these firms will  thrive  even though  the industry  has  declined. Since 
factors are  mobile in the Lancaster model, labor and capital will move out 
to the country’s expanding industries (although capital might migrate to 
the same industry in the other country) and interindustry effects will be 
much the same as in the traditional analysis. The important difference in 
the political economy of  the situation between the product-differentiated 
and homogeneous cases is that the surviving firms will be better off after 
trade in the former case, and thus firms that believe they will survive may 
favor trade liberalization  even though  they are in the disadvantaged 
industry. 
A special form of  comparative advantage may exist in the Lancaster 
framework  due to differences in the distribution of  consumer preferences 
between the two countries. Suppose the home country’s preferences are 
distributed in such a way that a majority prefer large cars to small, while 
the preferences in the foreign country are distributed in the opposite 
direction. If  the countries are otherwise similar, the home country will 
produce more models of  large cars, and those in larger quantities, than 
the foreign country. In terms of design experience, output capacity, and 
unit cost, the home country will have a comparative advantage in large 
cars, the foreign country in small. This is an intraindustry comparative 
advantage that makes it relatively clear which firms in each country’s 
automobile industry are likely to gain from trade, and which to lose.’ 
Comparative advantage in the Krugman model has very special fea- 
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never  occur-indeed,  the number  of  firms in each industry  and the 
outputs of  each firm remain the same before and after trade, with or 
without comparative advantage effects. The only effect of  trade on the 
industry itself is its effect on the wages (really rent) of  the industry- 
specific factors. Krugman defines comparative advantage as having a 
higher-than-average  proportion of  the industry-specific factor. In the 
normal case, trade makes the specific factor relatively less scarce in the 
world economy than it was beforehand in the country with the compara- 
tive disadvantage, so the rent falls relatively, while it rises in an industry 
with a comparative advantage. Owners of  the specific factor gain in the 
advantaged industry and lose in the disadvantaged one. However, the fall 
in rent in the disadvantaged industry may be more than offset by the gain 
in utility per dollar due to the increased product variety with trade, so the 
factors in the disadvantaged industry may still gain in welfare. This gain 
requires the offset of two effects, and will only occur if  the comparative 
advantage difference is relatively small. Krugman also introduces a per- 
verse case (having the strange property that goods outside the industry 
are better substitutes for goods in the industry than are other goods 
asserted to be in the same industry) in which rent rises in the “disadvan- 
taged” industry (which can actually be shown to have the advantage in 
terms of pre-trade prices). In this case, however, rent falls in the other 
industry. In either case, the results are similar to those of  the Stolper- 
Samuelson analysis in that one factor makes an unambiguous welfare 
gain while the other makes a welfare gain only if  the factor proportions 
are relatively similar between the countries.  Krugman is incorrect in 
arguing that all industries may  favor trade liberalization over a wide 
range of configuration-n  the basis of his own model this can only occur 
when the economies are relatively similar, and even then one industry’s 
gains will be intangible, due entirely to greater variety. 
The Political Economy of  Import Competition 
In a product-differentiated industry, import competition is also export 
opportunity, unless comparative advantage effects are so great as to lead 
to industry specialization.*  Thus there is a potential conflict of interest 
within the industry  between  those firms which fear to be put out of 
business by  trade liberalization and those that expect to survive and 
expand  their  output,  a  quite  different  situation  from  that  of  the 
homogeneous product industry in which all firms will gain or all will lose. 
Since the opening of  trade for a differentiated product industry will 
lead to major changes within the industry-some  firms vanishing, others 
expanding, all searching for the product designs appropriate to the world 
market-the  political pressures  in  the industry for and against trade 
liberalization  will  depend  on  the  distribution  of  expectations  and 
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is possible that all firms in both countries may oppose trade-even the 
firms in the country with the comparative advantage in the industry. At 
the other extreme, all firms (even those in the disadvantaged country) 
may favor trade if  they are all optimistic risk takers. It seems reasonable 
to expect, however, that the net pressures will be in favor of trade in the 
advantaged country and against in the disadvantaged, on average. In the 
identical country case, the balance is unclear. 
A special feature of  the political economy of  differentiated products is 
the likely pressure for highly specific trade barriers-special  tariffs on 
industry products with specifications lying between narrow limits, those 
of the products already produced by  the home industry. 
If  the industry is composed of multiproduct firms instead of the single- 
product firms assumed in the analysis, the views of  individual firms will 
depend on their mix  of  products as well as their expectations, but the 
potential for divergent views about trade liberalization is still there. 
Notes 
1. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
2. Lancaster (1979, 19806). 
3.  Lancaster (1980~). 
4. The world market equilibrium outputs may be more or less than twice the pre-trade 
level in each country, depending  on the elasticity of  substitution with respect to goods 
outside the industry, the shape of  the cost function, and other factors. 
5. But the balance of  payments mechanism, if  stable, will ensure that neither country 
produces more than half the total number of products. See Lancaster (1980~). 
6. Lancaster (1980~). 
7. An application of this reasoning to the United States automobile market at the present 
time should also take account of  a general shift in preferences toward small cars due to 
increased gasoline prices, an effect easily analyzed in terms of characteristics. In  addition, it 
should be noted that the analysis is based on  monopolistic competition (single-product 
firms), rather than the multiproduct oligopolies which characterize the international auto- 
mobile industry. It should be noted that the United States automobile industry needs to 
(and is attempting to) change its product mix. Tariffs on  small car imports would not help, 
but would probably hinder, this required structural change. 
8. The comments in this section are based on the use of  the Lancaster model only. 
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COInment  Michael Mussa 
Paul  Krugman has provided  us  with a stimulating paper that  argues 
pursuasively for the virtues of  a nontraditional model of  international 
trade that assumes increasing rather than constant returns to scale, that 
postulates monopolistic rather than perfect competition, and that focuses 
on the opportunities for consuming a greater diversity of commodities as 
a key benefit of international trade. I believe that the benefits of diversity 
are particularly important in economic theory, and that Paul Krugman’s 
paper is especially valuable because it provides us with an alternative 
analytical framework that adds a new perspective to our understanding of 
many important issues in international economics. My task as a critic, 
however, is not to praise Caesar, but rather to suggest some possible 
limitations and deficiencies of  his new imperial designs. Accordingly, I 
would like to emphasize three main reasons why we need to take very 
seriously Paul’s own caution that his model is “dependent on a number of 
very special assumptions. ” 
First, while the specification of  productive technology implies that 
there are increasing returns to scale in producing each individual com- 
modity, the profit-maximizing  decisions of firms, under the assumption of 
monopolist competition, always lead to a constant level of production of 
each commodity. The opening of trade between countries therefore does 
not yield any benefits from a reduction in costs associated with an in- 
crease in the scale of  production of  individual commodities. Thus in 
Krugman’s model we do not observe the important principle enunciated 
by Adam Smith that society benefits from the efficiencies generated by a 
more refined division of labor, made possible by broadening the extent of 
the market. 
Second, Krugman’s model has peculiar properties with respect to the 
degree of competition among firms in the same industry. As the number 
of  firms in an industry grows, the cross-price elasticity of  demand be- 
tween the differentiated products of these firms tends to zero; that is, a 
change in the price of  one firm’s product has virtually no effect on the 
demands for the products of other firms in the same industry. Moreover, 
the own-price elasticity of  demand for a firm’s product converges to a 
constant, E~ = 1  / (1 -  ei)  ,  that depends only on the parameters of  the 
utility function. These properties of Krugman’s model run counter to our 
normal intuition that, as the number of  firms in an industry producing 
differentiated products grows, their products will tend to become closer 
and closer substitutes, the cross-price elasticities of demand will become 
large, and the monopoly power of  any individual firm (measured by the 
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inverse of the own-price elasticity of demand for its product) will become 
small. Because Krugman’s model lacks these intuitively appealing prop- 
erties, I question its relevance to the key question of  the benefits of 
international trade in enforcing more competitive behavior in industries 
where increasing returns to scale limit the number of  firms that may 
efficiently operate within any national economy. This question is of vital 
importance in discussions of antitrust policy for a number of industries in 
the United States and presumably in other countries. 
Third, in my  judgment Krugman’s explanation of  intraindustry and 
interindustry trade relies too strongly on unrealistic implications of  his 
theoretical model. Under free trade, consumers in each country divide 
their expenditure equally among the products of all individual firms in a 
given  industry.  The ratio  of  foreign sales to domestic sales for any 
individual firm is equal to the ratio of foreign income to domestic income. 
Hence all firms in a given country, regardless of  industry, are equally 
engaged in international trade, in the sense that all individual firms have 
the same ratio of foreign sales to domestic sales. This is a very strong and 
(I believe) unrealistic implication of Krugman’s model. It leads directly to 
Krugman’s conclusions concerning intraindustry trade. Specifically, for 
two countries of equal size (income), each individual firm in both coun- 
tries always exports exactly half of  its output. If  the two countries have 
the same endowments of  factors specific to the various industries and 
hence the same number of  firms in each industry, then all trade will be 
“intraindustry” in the sense that trade will balance industry by industry. 
To the extent that endowments of  specific factors are not the same 
between the two countries, there will be “interindustry” trade in the 
sense that trade will not be balanced on an industry by industry basis. My 
concern is that to reach these conclusions  it should not be necessary to use 
a model with the unrealistic implication that all firms within a given 
country are equally engaged in trade. 
COmIllent  John S. Chipman 
I would like to draw attention to a seemingly innocent assumption con- 
tained in Krugman’s specification (4)  of  the production relations in his 
model. The condition that “the parameters ai  and pi  are assumed con- 
stant across the products within an industry” is not invariant with respect 
to changes in  the units of  measurement; this has consequences that 
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somewhat impair the credibility of the model, as I shall show by means of 
a simple illustration. 
Suppose that a technological change occurs in the production of com- 
modity j' in industry if,  so that for ij = i'j' we have, henceforth, 
(4')  = ai,  + Pipjqrjr  where pitip  <  Pi, (say), 
the relations (4)  remaining valid for ij  # i'j', In order to handle such a 
situation one would have to change the units of  measurement of  this 
commodity and replace the term qirj,  (the output of  the jrth  product of 
industry i')  by 
(4'  '1 
so that in terms of the new units of  measurement 
=  (yi' + piq' .,.,.  (4'  'I)  11 
Krugman's relations (4) thus remain formally valid with (4) replaced by 
(4"') for ij  = i'j'. 
However, for the model to remain consistent, one obviously would 
have to make the same change in units of measurement on the consump- 
tion side. Specifically, in  Krugman's equation (2) one would have to 
replace the term cifjt  (an individual's consumption of  the jtth  product of 
industry i')  by 
resulting in 
This term must replace  the previous expression for Cit in  the utility 
function (1). 
In short, for the model to remain consistent it must be assumed that 
preferences are tied to the technology; a technological change must be 
accompanied by  an exactly offsetting change in consumer preferences. 
This is no accident. It has been well known since Marschak's classic 
discussion of  the overdeterminacy of equilibrium under imperfect com- 
petition (Marschak 1950, pp. 92-93)  that if  all agents perceive the tech- 
nology and the market demand functions as they actually are, the system 
of  equations describing market equilibrium is overdetermined. One solu- 
tion is then to introduce some manifestly artificial conditions that will 
guarantee functional dependence as between preferences and the tech- 
nology. This is the solution adopted by Krugman. 220  Paul Krugman 
Fifteen years ago (Chipman 1965, pp. 736-49) I sketched an argument 
outlining an alternative approach, and five years later (Chipman 1970) I 
carried it out precisely in the context of  a model not unlike Krugman’s in 
which labor was the sole factor of production. The key to overcoming the 
overdeterminacy is to assume that individual producers perceive their 
production processes to operate under constant returns to scale, even if 
they do not. This is strictly analogous to the assumption adopted in the 
perfectly competitive model that each individual  perceives that he has no 
influence on the market price (whereas such a perception is obviously 
false, since the aggregate of  all individuals would then also have no 
influence on the market price). Similarly, one can in the case of monopo- 
listic competition assume that each firm perceives the demand curve for 
its product to be linear, say, and such as to pass through the equilibrium 
point with a slope equal to the slope of  the true demand curve at that 
point. Such an approach was introduced by Negishi (1941) and has been 
carried out successfully by Silvestre (1977). The idea has recently been 
applied to international trade theory by Inoue (1981). It is an obvious 
generalization  of  the  idealization  used  in  the  perfectly  competitive 
model. 
The  above  is  certainly  not  the  only  viable  alternative  approach. 
Another  is  to follow the lead  of  Aumann  (1964)  in  postulating the 
existence of  a continuum of  agents, each being identified, say, with a 
point on the unit interval  [0,1]. In the Walrasian general-equilibrium 
framework, Zeno’s paradox that the whole cannot exceed the sum of its 
parts is resolved by  virtue of  the fact that no one of  the infinitesimal 
agents has any influence on the price, whereas any open interval of agents 
does; any single agent has measure zero. The same idea can be carried 
over to the theory of  product differentiation and increasing returns to 
scale, as has indeed been done recently by Helpman (1981). 
With either one of  these approaches one can avoid the artificial func- 
tional dependence between technology and tastes that Krugman’s for- 
mulation necessarily entails. 
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